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Comparing Eastleigh, Nairobi, and Xiaobei, Guangzhou, 
as Sites of South-South Migration
Neil Carrier and Gordon Mathews
  ABSTRACT: Th is article looks at two urban landscapes critical for mobility within the 
Global South: Eastleigh, Kenya, and Xiaobei, China. While diff erent, they are both cen-
ters of global trade that attract migrants seeking livelihoods, and are also regarded with 
great ambivalence within the countries that host them. We ex plore this ambivalence, 
showing how it links to fear of the “others” who animate them, and to broader politics 
in which migrants become caught. Such places oft en simultaneously attract members 
of the host society for a taste of the other, or business opportunities, yet also repel and 
induce fear as places of danger. For the migrant population, there is also ambivalence—
as they are places that off er both opportunity for social mobility, yet also places of hard 
lives and immobility. In short, both are critical nodes in patterns of South-South mobil-
ity where dynamics of such mobility and reaction to it can be understood.
  KEYWORDS: Africa-China, Eastleigh, “low end” globalization, migration, South-South 
mobility, urbanity, Xiaobei 
Introduction
City districts oft en become emblematic of migration, the numerous Little Italys and China-
towns of the world being cases in point. Th is article looks at two interconnected sites in the 
“Global South” that have become emblematic of much South-South migration and mobility: 
Eastleigh, Nairobi’s “Little Mogadishu,” and Xiaobei, the most important African district of 
Guangzhou. While diff erent in numerous ways, they both reveal patterns of mobility in the 
Global South and how this mobility is perceived and treated by host countries. As trade hubs 
they also reveal how much mobility of people within the Global South depends on the fl ow 
of trade goods, principally those of what has been termed “low-end globalisation” (Mathews 
2018). Th ere is a shift ing constellation of such trade hubs across the world, many linking Afri-
can countries to those of Asia. Not all these hubs can be easily defi ned as being in the “Global 
South,” in the usual defi nition of low- and middle-income (“developing”) countries, especially 
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places like Hong Kong and Dubai, and they also connect strongly to cities in the “North” too: 
understanding such mobility as purely a “South-South” phenomenon is bound to be restrictive 
and inaccurate (Bakewell 2009). Yet a critical look at such sites and the mobility that shaped 
them and that they shape in turn shows dynamic relations of crucial importance, but ones 
oft en obscured by the dominance of so-called “global cities” of the North in the migration and 
urban studies literature.
Th is article is based on ethnographic research carried out over several years by Neil Car-
rier in Nairobi and Gordon Mathews and his students in Guangzhou. Carrier has been visiting 
East leigh since 1999, and conducted research there from 2011 to 2014 on how the estate had 
developed into the global hub of today. As well as participant observation over many months, 
interviews, and archival research, Carrier conducted several questionnaire surveys of Somali, 
Ethiopian, and Kenyan traders and residents living in the estate (Carrier 2016). Mathews’s 
research entailed a year spent living in the various traders’ hotels in Xiaobei in Guangzhou in 
2013–2014, as well as numerous research visits to the city in 2011–2012 and 2015–2016 along 
with his students Linessa Lin Dan and Yang Yang. Th eir research was conducted through par-
ticipant observation and also through interviews conducted with some 230 African and Arab 
traders and logistics agents as well as Chinese merchants in Xiaobei (Mathews et al. 2017). 
Th is article builds on our shared interest in the connections between such hubs, connections 
evident in our respective single-sited research projects that show how such sites as Eastleigh and 
Xiaobei cannot be understood without understanding what connects them to so many other 
hubs across the world. Indeed, Mathews’s research on Guangzhou led him directly to Eastleigh. 
People, capital, and goods constantly circulate through these sites, very oft en the same people, 
capital, and goods, and it is in such places that many dreams of mobility and social mobility take 
shape. Th e article will accordingly give overviews of Eastleigh and Xiaobei and their mobility 
dynamics, dynamics that share some similarities (being generally built on the “low-end” trade 
in similar goods, and operated by some of the same transnational actors), as well as contrasts 
(Eastleigh being mainly a site of regional migration, and Xiaobei a site of mainly global migra-
tion). While the article shows how such places of “South-South” migration off er opportunities 
for literal and social mobility—opportunities that the Global North attempts to restrict for cit-
izens of the South—they can hardly be idealized as places of progressive migration politics. 
Indeed, both places show that migration and mobility within the Global South meet as much 
ambivalence and outright hostility as they do in the North.
“Low-End” Global Hubs and “South-South” Mobility
In the last few decades, “global city” has become an important concept in studying urbanization 
and globalization through the work of Saskia Sassen (1991). Her work focused on London, New 
York, and Tokyo, and criticized the globalization literature for its lack of focus on the actual 
places where globalization took shape. Instead, Sassen showed how globalization was very much 
emplaced, primarily within these interconnected cities. While giving new purchase on contem-
porary patterns of globalization, such literature can give the impression that such worldly urban 
spaces are principally located in the wealthy Global North. Such an impression might be fur-
ther reinforced by literature on globalization, such as James Ferguson’s Global Shadows (2006), 
which emphasized how global fl ows of capital investment are not all-encompassing, but oft en 
hop and skip over parts of the world, including much of Africa. Yet global connections are not 
the preserve of elite cities: many parts of Africa and elsewhere in the Global South are incorpo-
rated into global fl ows, just not necessarily those of “high-end globalization.”
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Indeed, much of the Global South is globally connected, yet connected in ways previously 
missed in analyses of globalization. Most people in the world today, particularly in the devel-
oping world, experience globalization not through the “high-end globalization” of Apple, Sam-
sung, Google, McDonald’s, and Huawei, huge corporations with multitudes of lawyers and vast 
budgets for advertising. Rather, globalization comes to them through “low-end globalization,” 
the transnational fl ow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and 
informal, sometimes semilegal or illegal transactions, most oft en found in the developing world, 
but apparent in various forms throughout the world. Th ese two forms of globalization are oft en 
intermingled, and many traders engage in both in diff erent times and places; but they are clearly 
distinguishable as diff erent forms of globalization (see Mathews et al. 2017: 81–113). Low-end 
globalization was termed “the informal economy” in the 1970s (Hart 1973; Portes et al. 1989), 
but has been more recently discussed in terms of globalization (Mathews et al. 2012; Neuwirth 
2011), whether as “globalization from below” or “low-end globalization.” Low-end globalization 
typically takes place without contracts or recourse to the law; it is run most typically through 
wads of cash and reserves of interpersonal trust (Carrier and Elliott 2018). Th is is the form 
of globalization that has enabled the developing world to experience the global—thanks to 
largely knockoff  and copied goods manufactured in China, bought in neighborhoods in Guang-
zhou such as Xiaobei, and sent to global nodes such as, among the most prominent, Eastleigh. 
Emblematic of low-end globalization is the smartphone, which has helped democratize global-
ization, enabling not just the developed world but the entire world to experience the internet 
(although of course many inequalities remain in this regard). Th e developing world may once 
have been “abjected” from much globalization so celebrated in the 1990s (Allen and Hamnett 
1995: 2; Ferguson 2006: 25–49), but with the emergence of cheap phones and other goods of 
globalization, most generally copies or knockoff s made in China, global goods can be acquired 
practically worldwide.
Like the global connections focused on by Sassen, this globalization is also emplaced—mostly 
in urban places like Chungking Mansions (Mathews 2011), Hong Kong’s “low-end” shopping 
mall much frequented by traders from Africa and South Asia, and in our case studies for this 
article. Th ese are hubs for global trade and communication, oft en disconnected in some ways 
from the geographical territory in which they reside. Th ey act as nodes for trade networks criss-
crossing the globe, but are especially strongly interconnected within the Global South. While 
some of these hubs have long been sites of trade and commerce—for example, Dubai—others, 
including Eastleigh and Xiaobei, have come to prominence much more recently, oft en in the 
wake of trade liberalization policies of the 1990s, and the rapid growth of China as the world’s 
factory. Th e speed of change in some of these hubs has been breathtaking, with landscapes such 
as those of Eastleigh transformed.
As well as being hubs for “low-end” goods and capital, these are also hubs for migration and 
mobility. Indeed, these places are critical sites for understanding South-South mobility and its 
dynamics. Much focus in recent years has been on links between migration/mobility and the 
city: how cities are formed through movement of people, and how they spur further mobility 
in turn (Carrier and Scharrer 2019). Th e trade hubs we focus on depend on human mobility 
regionally and globally: it is oft en to such sites that people venture in search of livelihoods and 
even the chance to reach desired, wealthier places. In these places, the success of earlier gen-
erations of mobile entrepreneurs—evident in businesses and buildings—encourages others to 
try their luck in trade, while news of current opportunities travels fast. While they are places 
where global dreams are forged, they also can be harsh places where dreams of mobility (both 
literal mobility and social mobility) are dashed and people become stuck. Indeed, as we show in 
what follows, low-end globalization has sparked much economic development—development 
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evident in its hubs—yet it cannot be relied upon for sustainable futures, especially as such places 
are seen with great suspicion by the states that host them (see the essays in Mathews et al. 2012). 
Th ese hubs of South-South migration show all too clearly how it is not only in the Global North 
that migrants have to navigate deeply hostile policies and outright xenophobia, as our case stud-
ies will demonstrate.
Eastleigh
Our fi rst case study, Eastleigh, is an estate known throughout the world, partly because it has 
received international media attention due to its fascinating economy and refugee population—
and for the oft en heavy-handed approach of the Kenyan state to its population—but also because 
it is so well-known among the global Somali diaspora. Indeed, in meeting Somalis in the US, 
Australia, Norway, and many other countries, one is likely to meet people who have either lived 
or visited Eastleigh, or who have relatives there. It is a global Somali hub (Carrier 2016), and a 
center of global Somali trade and politics. Somali identity is strong in the estate, with the Somali 
language being spoken widely and also conspicuous in names of businesses, and the blue-and-
white fl ag of the Somali nation is commonly displayed. It is evident why it has become known 
as a “Little Mogadishu,” acting as it does as a displaced capital of the Somali world since the civil 
war in Somalia. However, it is also much more diverse (and even “super-diverse,” to use Steven 
Vertovec’s [2007] term for the hypercomplex forms of identity now common in major sites of 
migration around the world), and much more Kenyan than the name “Little Mogadishu” sug-
gests. Indeed, ethnic Somali visitors to the estate are oft en US or UK nationals, while Chinese 
suppliers, Africans from as far afi eld as the Congo, and Ethiopians (many of whom are refugees 
living in the estate) also reside and work there. Much of its Somali population is also Kenyan 
by nationality—Somalis form a large ethnic group in Kenya, mainly in the northeast of the 
country—while the estate is home to members of many other Kenyan ethnicities.
Th is cosmopolitan “ethnoscape” is not just a recent phenomenon. From its very earliest days 
in the 1910s, Eastleigh was a diverse place where many had links to faraway places (Carrier 
2016: chap. 1). Th e land that formed Eastleigh was fi rst planned out in the early twentieth cen-
tury by a group of European and South African land speculators. Although initially conceived as 
a European estate within Nairobi’s racialized planning, it soon became home instead to Nairobi’s 
considerable Indian population, who would dominate demographically until the late colonial 
period. Th is population was itself diverse, with a mixed population including Goans and Pun-
jabis, and by the 1950s Indian identity was inscribed on several of the street names of the estate, 
for example, Girmar Lane. While designated a non-African estate in the colonial era, it also 
accommodated a substantial population of Kikuyus and others (White 1990).
Eastleigh had a Somali population from early on. While oft en seen as a nomadic pastoralist 
people (Whittaker 2019), there is a long history of Somali urbanity, and Somalis originating in 
the British Protectorate of Somaliland settled in the estate in the late 1910s. Farah Aden, the 
housekeeper of Karen Blixen, was one such Somali who settled with his family in the earliest 
days of the estate. Th ere was a small but conspicuous Somali presence in Eastleigh throughout 
the colonial era and early days of Independence, supplemented by newcomers from Somali 
clans from northern Kenya, for whom Eastleigh became their urban base.
Post-Independence, much of the Indian population was replaced by non-Somali Africans, 
principally Kikuyu, who bought up many of the plots. Meanwhile, the Somali population con-
tinued to grow, Eastleigh also hosting Somali refugees in the 1970s, including a number fl ee-
ing the Ogaden War. But it was in the late 1980s when the estate’s current demographics took 
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shape as thousands of Somali refugees settled there as an alternative to Kenya’s refugee camps. 
While exact fi gures for the number of Somalis in Eastleigh are unavailable, the rise between 
1979 and 1999 in Eastleigh’s wider population speaks of growth driven by both a refugee infl ux, 
urban mobility, and rural-urban migration within Kenya: the population rose from 53,562 to 
246,420, a rise of 360 percent (Asoka et al. 2013). While only a proportion of this total would 
be accounted for by Somalis, as other groups were in-migrating too, it is likely that over 10,000 
Somali refugees were living in Eastleigh by the mid-1990s.
It was these refugees who would begin the conversion of Eastleigh into a commercial hub. 
Among them were those experienced in trade and business in Mogadishu and elsewhere in 
Somalia, and who had contacts in places like Dubai. Th ey were able to source cheap clothes 
(some smuggled into Kenya through Somalia), and sold these from their lodging rooms, stor-
ing the goods under their beds at night, and displaying them on their beds during the day for 
customers. A canny Kenyan-Somali woman saw the possibilities as more and more Kenyans 
came to the estate to buy clothes sold much cheaper than those in city center Nairobi shops. She 
converted one of the lodgings—Garissa Lodge—into a shopping mall that formed the blueprint 
for the Eastleigh malls that would follow: large buildings brimming with tiny shops from where 
the goods of low-end globalization can be sold. Th ere are now around 50 such buildings, most 
of which follow this same blueprint. Somali women remain highly visible in all this economic 
activity too, many successful shops being owned by women, and even some of the malls them-
selves, including Garissa Lodge, although the strengthening of reformist forms of Islam in the 
estate has somewhat excluded women from some business networks (Carrier 2016: chap. 3; 
Ritchie 2019).
All this commercial growth has been built on mobility. Most obviously, the in-migration of 
refugees from Somalia is central to how the estate has developed demographically and econom-
ically, as is the increasing presence of Kenyan Somalis through rural-urban migration. For all 
these Somalis (especially those from well-represented clans), Eastleigh—despite its dangers that 
we will get to below—is somewhere they can feel at home through the presence of so many other 
Somalis. It is also a place where physical mobility can translate into social mobility, for those 
fortunate enough to become successful within its economy.
Eastleigh’s growth is also a story of migration and mobility between the Global South and 
North. Many there hope that it will prove a springboard for onward migration to wealthy coun-
tries, though for most this remains a dream fed by buufi s, the Somali term for a longing for 
resettlement elsewhere. For many Eastleigh can be a place of immobility. Th is is true for Ethio-
pian Oromo refugees in the estate too, and for those that cannot reach the desired lands of the 
West (or South Africa, the next stop for some aft er Eastleigh), years of frustration can pass by in 
Eastleigh (Carrier and Kochore 2019).1 However, much money is sent as remittances for people 
in Eastleigh from relatives in places like London and Minneapolis (Lindley 2010), and much 
of this is used to help establish businesses. Bigger investments are also made, as opportunities 
to buy shares or shops in new mall developments are advertised on cable TV and other media 
across the Somali world. Diaspora investors oft en come in person too, establishing restaurants 
and other businesses somewhere that off er better returns than can be made in wealthy devel-
oped countries. Such investors have oft en worked hard in countries such as the UK and the US 
in jobs like taxi driving, saving diligently over the years. Eastleigh can off er such investors the 
chance to build businesses out of these savings, although some fi nd navigating the less formal-
ized business landscape of Nairobi diffi  cult aft er life in Western cities.
While much business capital fl ows into Eastleigh from the Global North, the goods for which 
the estate is famous revolve around South-South mobility. Indeed, the development of Eastleigh 
is a story of ever-expanding trade networks that tap into the low-end global economy. Th ere 
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are Kenyan-sourced commodities sold in the estate, but Eastleigh is most famous for clothes, 
jewelry, electronics, and other goods sourced through Somali-run networks that stretch from 
East Africa all the way to Asia. While original brands of clothing and electronics are available in 
the estate, there are many copied and knockoff  goods too: one is more likely to fi nd Hoog Boss 
there than Hugo Boss.
In the early 1990s, as Eastleigh’s economy was growing, Dubai was the principal place from 
where its goods were sourced, a place that has long had a Somali population (Marchal 2001). 
Dubai remains important (and one of the earliest Eastleigh malls was named Dubai Mall in 
recognition of its importance to the estate), but Somali networks and their infrastructure of 
brokers, shipping and clearing agents, and money-transfer companies (hawala) have grown to 
incorporate many trade hubs, principally those in the Global South. Bangkok and Hong Kong 
were two places soon incorporated into Eastleigh’s geography of trade, and also two places still 
recognized in the geography of Eastleigh itself: Bangkok Mall and Hong Kong Mall neighbor 
each other in Eastleigh. Th e opening up and development of key Chinese hubs for low-end 
goods such as Guangzhou in the late 1990s spurred Eastleigh’s growth. Containers from China 
brimming with clothes and other goods constantly arrive. Somali networks are highly fl exible, 
however, and more recently Istanbul has become a key source of goods sold, especially men’s 
suits, seen as being a step up in quality from the goods of China. Th ese goods are critical ele-
ments in the story of the estate, being the key reason why the estate is popularly visited by Ken-
yans, and people from even farther afi eld. Th ey off er aff ordable clothes and electronics, allowing 
Kenyans to participate in global fashion trends, and also off er further livelihood opportunities 
to those who buy wholesale in Eastleigh to retail in other parts of the region.
Th is economy of “low-end” malls and goods—and informal business practices, much of the 
estate fl owing on exchanges underpinned by social relations and “trust” (Carrier and Elliott 
2018) rather than legal contracts—has off ered opportunity to many, from refugees to Kenyan 
Somalis to Kenyans of other ethnicities whose livelihoods depend on the links of Eastleigh to 
other low-end global trade hubs. However, only a very few become rich in this economy, and 
many see dreams of entrepreneurial success come to naught: just as people hoping that Eastleigh 
can prove a stepping-stone to mobility toward more desired places in the Global North can fi nd 
themselves immobile, so can many of those hoping Eastleigh’s economy will allow them social 
mobility fi nd themselves stuck.
Th e Kenyan state does well economically out of Eastleigh: although much trade has its infor-
mal side, and some evades the state altogether, revenue from rates, import duty, business per-
mits, and the like mean that Eastleigh provides income to the Nairobi County government. Its 
role as a source of employment and entrepreneurial opportunities also enhances the argument 
that the estate is an economic boon to Kenya, an argument advocates among the Eastleigh busi-
ness community are always keen to make. Th e reason they are so keen to do so is that this hub 
of mobile people and mobile goods is oft en felt to be under threat from wider Kenyan society.
In fact, how Eastleigh is perceived and treated by wider Kenyan society appears to oscillate 
between poles of suspicion as a place of illegal people and goods, and praise as a key business 
district linking Kenya to the world. Th e former pole oft en appears most dominant. Eastleigh 
has long been seen as diff erent from the rest of Nairobi in terms of people and architecture. Its 
transformation into a Somali hub has further increased this sense of diff erence, as Somalis in 
Kenya have long been treated as suspect by the Kenyan state, ever since the 1960s and a war of 
secession in which many ethnic Somalis in Kenya fought for the northern region to secede to 
Somalia. Harsh security measures against Somalis (including atrocities such as the infamous 
Wagalla massacre) blighted the 1970s and 1980s, while the arrival of hundreds of thousands 
of Somali refugees in the late 1980s led to regular screening exercises attempting to determine 
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whether Somalis were Kenyan or “illegal aliens.” All this has been heightened by the securitiza-
tion of refugee policy in Kenya following the Kenyan military’s operations against Al Shabaab 
in Somalia, and reprisal attacks by Al Shabaab that have rendered Somalis further suspect. Such 
exercises have regularly targeted Eastleigh over the years, most recently in the heavy-handed 
security operation of 2014 when many were rounded up in Eastleigh and elsewhere and held 
in a sports stadium. At that time, many Somalis moved from Eastleigh to Uganda—which has 
long had a more welcoming policy to refugees—forming a new “Little Mogadishu” in Kampala 
(Iazzolino 2019), showing how responsive are dynamics of mobility to political shocks. Th is sus-
picion of Eastleigh as somewhere alien and dangerous—a place of otherness—even made it into 
international cinema. In the fi lm Eye in the Sky, Eastleigh is portrayed as under the control of Al 
Shabaab militia driving around in “technicals,” pickup trucks with powerful machine guns. Th is 
portrayal is suggestive of how this part of Nairobi is perceived by some Kenyans as somewhere 
alien, as a dangerous part of Mogadishu dropped into the heart of Kenya.
On the other hand, Eastleigh has allies among Kenyan elites, and there have been attempts 
to incorporate Eastleigh more into the Kenyan mainstream. Eastleigh has been spoken of pos-
itively as a major business hub, one that should be included in Kenya’s development agenda, 
Vision 2030 (Carrier 2016: chap. 7). Th e current MP for Kamukunji—the constituency of which 
Eastleigh is a part—has also advocated for the estate, and is part of a broader group of Kenyan 
Somali politicians who have infl uence at the highest level. Somalis are no longer marginal in 
Kenya, politically and economically, and infl uential fi gures in Eastleigh are also active on social 
media and mainstream media to promote the estate and its business (Carrier 2019; Hassan 
2019).
In many ways, Eastleigh does appear to be gaining a fi rmer foothold within Kenya, giving 
more security for its businesspeople and their trade. Indeed, Eastleigh business is even gentri-
fying in some ways, moving away from the “low-end” model, with new malls built with slicker 
designs and incorporating mainstream Kenyan chain stores and banks too: in some ways, the 
Eastleigh economy is formalizing. Somalis have also expanded well beyond Eastleigh within 
Nairobi, now owning many businesses in the central business district too, demonstrating their 
stronger footing (Hassan 2019). Yet Eastleigh and Somali business in general are still at risk 
of the fl uctuating politics within Kenya. Somalis—Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees—have 
proved useful scapegoats for the state on numerous occasions and might prove so again, even 
with more allies in the higher echelons of Kenyan society and politics.
Th us, Eastleigh and its residents and businesspeople are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of Ken-
yan politics. But, as a major conduit for goods popular in Kenya and beyond, and as a hub of 
mobility and social mobility through global connections, the estate also transcends its Ken-
yan location in various ways—it is many ways a “global city” (Sassen 1991) that gains power 
through its linkages to the global Somali diaspora, and to a constellation of other trade hubs. 
Understanding the estate and its power to attract in-migration is an exercise in scalar analysis, 
requiring both attention to its local and national context, and to its numerous links to elsewhere. 
One such crucial elsewhere is Guangzhou, to which we now turn.
Xiaobei
Guangzhou, once known as Canton, has had a long history of foreign traders for two thou-
sand years, but also a history of wanting to keep foreigners at bay, apart from the local popula-
tion. Aft er 1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic of China, foreigners largely vanished 
from Guangzhou, but began returning in the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, 
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as Guangdong Province, of which Guangzhou is the capital, became the manufacturing pow-
erhouse for the world. Unlike several other foreign neighborhoods in Guangzhou, the homes 
of affl  uent Europeans and Japanese, the foreigners in Xiaobei are predominantly African and 
Arab. Th ere are no exact population fi gures for Xiaobei, because although the area is universally 
known as Xiaobei, it is not a district with formal boundaries, but rather is the name of a street 
and a subway station. Th ere are only a few hundred Africans and Arabs resident in Xiaobei, due 
to Chinese residence restrictions, but there are typically thousands of Africans and Arabs in the 
area during aft ernoons and evenings (except during Chinese New Year, January through March, 
when Chinese businesses are closed)—it is the African and Arab heart of Guangzhou.
Guangzhou’s Xiaobei is distinctly comparable to Nairobi’s Eastleigh: many of the themes in 
the preceding section on Eastleigh ring true for Guangzhou. Both are neighborhoods where 
minority immigrants are found: in Eastleigh, Somalis in Kenyan Nairobi; in Xiaobei, sub-
Saharan Africans and Arabs in Chinese Guangzhou. Local populations view both of these 
neighborhoods with trepidation as well as with a degree of attraction: just as Kenyans both fear 
Eastleigh and buy goods in Eastleigh, so too many Chinese in Guangzhou view Xiaobei with 
apprehension as a site of developing-world foreigners in China, while others delight in that for-
eignness: members of both camps of Chinese may say, “When I’m in Xiaobei, I don’t feel like I’m 
in China anymore! I feel like I’m a foreigner here” (Mathews et al. 2017: 5). Just as Kenyan police 
closely watch the streets of Eastleigh looking for illegal Somali migrants, so too do Chinese 
police tightly monitor the streets of Xiaobei, seeking Africans and Arabs without proper visas, 
who, once found, are quickly taken off  to jail. Th ese neighborhoods are sites of feelings of home 
for Somalis in Kenya and Africans and Arabs in China—just as Eastleigh features its mosques 
but also its hamburger joints for Somali Americans, so too Xiaobei has its nearby mosque and 
prayer spaces, and underground Christian churches, forbidden by the Chinese government; and 
in the stalls of Baohan Street or Huanshi Middle Road or the upper fl oors of the Tianxiu Build-
ing, virtually every kind of African or Arab cuisine is available for patrons. Both neighborhoods 
embody dreams and rarely the reality of unimaginable wealth: in one of Eastleigh’s clothing 
stalls, a clever merchant can make magnitudes more money than the per capita income of her 
home country, something all the truer in Guangzhou, where a clever and lucky trader may have 
an item manufactured by a Chinese company, ship it home by container, and potentially make 
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. By the same token the possibility of ruin is always 
apparent: contracts and courts may be of minimal use in both of these neighborhoods, and a 
cheating supplier, a customer’s broken promise, a delayed container, or a confi scation of copied 
goods by authorities may mean ruin (see Lan 2017: 72–93; Mathews et al. 2017: 62–66)
Xiaobei diff ers from Eastleigh in many respects, not least in the eff ects of the colonial back-
ground on Eastleigh, as refl ected in its very name; but two key contemporary diff erences con-
cern the locus of trade in the two places, and the relation of local to nonlocal populations. While 
Eastleigh is a regional hub for Somalis obtaining goods from China and selling those goods to 
customers throughout East Africa, Xiaobei is a global hub, where African and Arab traders 
come to buy China-manufactured goods and send them to their home countries or regions 
to sell. Guangzhou, or its smaller rival in China, Yiwu, are the end points of a global circuit of 
low-end globalization that includes Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok, Istanbul, Dubai, 
and Nairobi, as well as Lagos and a number of other cities. Th is circuit is one that is personally 
followed by many traders we know: for example, Somali traders, as well as traders from a very 
wide range of other developing-world societies, come to Guangzhou to buy shoes or bags or 
clothing manufactured to specifi cation in Guangdong Province, and perhaps go to Bangkok or 
Ho Chi Minh City as well to buy similar goods. One might query why merchants in Eastleigh 
and all the other developing-world locales from which entrepreneurs go to China to buy goods 
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cannot simply do this online. Th e answer is trust. If a merchant or her agents cannot personally 
inspect at critical points the goods manufactured by a Chinese factory or sold by a wholesaler, 
then the chances of being cheated or having goods stolen may be prohibitively high. Th e mer-
chants or agents must be there to observe, in Eastleigh and in Xiaobei and, if possible, at points 
in between when, for example, containers are loaded.
Another diff erence between Eastleigh and Guangzhou concerns the diff erent relations of the 
nonlocal to the local populations in the two places. While Eastleigh has many undocumented 
people among its residents, its population as a whole is clearly part of Kenya, exerting its own 
political power, with Kenyan Somali politicians having infl uence in Kenya. Xiaobei’s African 
and Arab foreigners, on the other hand, are unambiguously foreign in the context of China, 
and although scholars have asked whether there might be an emergent new African Chinese 
ethnic group in the future (Bodomo 2010), or whether China might ever have its own Barack 
Obama (Mathews et al. 2017: 195–220), this seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, 
in a China that today seems to be doubling down on its Han Chineseness as against the for-
eign world. Th e foreigners in Xiaobei are seen as distinctly foreign and have no political power. 
Africans and Arabs—who practice low-end globalization in the same way in Xiaobei, although 
Arab traders on average have more capital—frequent diff erent areas of Xiaobei, as separated by 
Huanshi Middle Road, and do not interact much socially. In private, African Christians some-
times deride Arabs as “terrorists,” while Arabs may deride Africans as “drug dealers” (Mathews 
et al. 2017: 12); but Muslim Africans oft en eat with Arabs in common halal restaurants, as well 
as praying together at the nearby mosque. Overt quarrels between members of the two groups 
rarely happen, largely because both are fully occupied in trying to get by in a Chinese envi-
ronment they may fi nd bewildering, and in which they may feel in continual danger of being 
cheated by their Chinese suppliers (Mathews et al. 2017: 62–66).
Th ere is an array of diff erent more or less outsider populations in Xiaobei and in Guang-
zhou as a whole. Th ese include the millions of Chinese in Guangzhou, oft en migrants from the 
countryside, who lack Guangzhou residence permits (hukou). It is oft en women without hukou 
who became economically and sometimes romantically involved with African and Arab entre-
preneurs, since they are at a disadvantage in the city, and can better their prospects through 
such relationships. Th ere have also been Hui and Uyghur Muslim minority groups in Xiaobei, 
with the Hui acting as informal (and illegal) money changers, and Uyghurs selling a vast array 
of products, from bread to mutton to mobile phones to furs, in hawker stands in 2013–2014. 
Finally, and most outside among these groups, there are foreign traders from Africa and the 
Arab world. Xiaobei has become well-known in China and to some extent throughout the 
world, designated as “Chocolate City” by local Chinese (Pang et al. 2013). Th e ethnoscape of 
Xiaobei is even more diverse than that of Eastleigh, with one street full of Arab restaurants, sev-
eral cafes the haunt of French-speaking Africans, and streets and malls full of “African grocery 
stores” as well as halal restaurants and shops selling virtually every imaginable good, retail or 
wholesale. Th ere is a separate neighborhood, Sanyuanli, some three kilometers away, that has 
been the home primarily of Nigerian Igbo in their business—but even they come to Xiaobei by 
night, for it is where African traders stay up until the late hours, socializing and enjoying life.2
Xiaobei has only recently emerged as a home of developing-world foreigners, with African 
traders beginning to arrive only in the late 1990s. By 2007, the Guangzhou Daily claimed that 
there were 200,000 Africans in Guangzhou (Mathews et al. 2017: 56), but that number was 
wildly exaggerated, it seems; it is likely that there were no more than 30,000, and by the time 
Mathews and his students engaged in their research in 2013–2014, their estimate of the African 
population of Guangzhou was 10,000–20,000, many of whom frequented Xiaobei; the Arab 
population was considerably smaller. Xiaobei emerged as a settlement site for African and Arab 
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traders because it is near the main Guangzhou Railway Station and also Guangzhou’s most 
prominent mosque, as well as being the site of a remaining “urban village” and thus of relatively 
low rents. Charlotte Ikels’s (1996) ethnography of a Guangzhou neighborhood apparently quite 
close to Xiaobei (the neighborhood is disguised in her account) depicts no foreigners at all—in 
this regard, the emergence of a neighborhood of African and Arab traders in such a short time 
is quite extraordinary. Some 30 percent of the African traders in Xiaobei are female, but much 
more than male traders, their stays tend to be short-term; it is partly because men typically stay 
longer, whether legally or illegally, that romantic relations tend overwhelmingly to be between 
African and Arab men and Chinese women.
Th e European and American traders who came to Guangzhou in the 1700s and 1800s were 
kept in specifi cally designated foreigners’ areas and were forbidden to learn Chinese (see Blussé 
2008; Downs 2014). Th eir enforced isolation is not shared by today’s African and Arab traders, 
but those traders still may feel distinctly isolated, with most of the African and Arab traders 
Mathews spoke with reporting that they had no Chinese friends—other than, perhaps, Chinese 
girlfriends. Offi  cial word on such a matter cannot be found, but it does seem that, following 
the opening of the Chinese economy in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese authorities were sur-
prised by the coming of developing-world traders to Guangzhou and elsewhere in China. As 
one Chinese professor reported, when Guangzhou opened up in the 1990s, “we expected white 
people to come, not black people” (Mathews et al. 2017: 50). Chinese racism against Africans is 
well-documented (Cheng 2011; Sautman 1994), although how much it is due to skin color and 
how much to the perceived poverty of those of a given skin color remains an open question. 
On the internet racism is apparent, sometimes in terms of rants against Africans in Guangzhou 
(Lan 2017: 45–71); but in life on the ground in Xiaobei, there is a degree of equanimity, simply 
because money is to be made. Africans and Arabs sometimes complain about the racism of 
Chinese police in endlessly asking to see their IDs. Xiaobei has been very much “cleaned up” in 
recent years, with a much greater and more visible police presence. Jessica Wilczak (2018) has 
argued that this is due not so much to Chinese racism as to the desire of the authorities to create 
a metropolis that is globalized but also “clean, safe and orderly.”
African and Arab traders who come to Guangzhou oft en arrive with little knowledge of the 
place, relying extensively on logistics agents of their own ethnicity who also serve as cultural 
brokers, and who may provide them with services ranging from meeting them at the airport to 
providing meals from their home country and a bed to sleep in. Most African and Arab traders 
come and go, within the limits of their limited-stay visas, but some remain, renewing their visas, 
obtaining business visas, or becoming overstayers. Some of these traders—particularly if they 
fall in love with Chinese and start families (see Mathews et al. 2017: 197–213)—stay and seek 
to make China home.
Th is becomes an extraordinary problem as far as China is concerned (although the situation 
is complicated: see Lan 2015). Frank Pieke (2012) has written of “immigrant China,” refl ecting 
on the fact that more and more foreigners have been coming to China; but as Robert Castillo 
has noted, “It is impossible to ‘immigrate’ to China” (2014: 242) in the way that immigration is 
thought of in Western countries, in that China lacks the legal framework to account for immi-
gration; even those very rare foreigners who obtain “permanent residence” must register with 
authorities every year. As one Arab trader bitterly commented, “permanent residence in China 
isn’t permanent” (see Mathews et al. 2017: 196). Underlying this is the sense that “China is for 
Chinese,” not for foreigners, and particularly not for developing-world foreigners. Th is attitude 
is partly due to China’s basis in ethnic more than civic identity—a foreigner cannot become 
Chinese in the same way that she could, for example, become Canadian (see Wu 1991)—and 
partly due to the fact that China is changing, becoming, in short, more “developed world,” less a 
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part of the Global South and more a part of the Global North. Guangzhou was earlier so attrac-
tive for traders from the developing world because it off ered electronic and other goods that 
were knockoff s of iPhones or Louis Vuitton bags that looked good and generally worked well, 
at least for a while, at 30 percent of the price of the original. As China becomes wealthier—and 
as Chinese factory workers’ wages in Guangdong go up—this era may be ending (just as it 
ended many postwar decades ago in Japan, then in Korea, and then in Taiwan as centers for the 
making of copied and knockoff  goods). Adding to this is the fact that to the middlemen go the 
profi ts: it clearly is to China’s benefi t to have its companies and factories in African and other 
developing-world countries rather than to have foreign traders come to China.
Indeed, Xiaobei has changed over the past several years, as earlier mentioned. When 
Mathews and his coauthors did research in Xiaobei in 2013–2014, it was a bustling site full of 
Uyghur merchants selling meat and bread and furs, Hui money changers changing money on 
the black market, and many thousands of African overstayers, whose visas to be in China had 
expired, but who were in the situation of feeling that they couldn’t leave China yet because the 
goods they had ordered were still being manufactured and they couldn’t surrender their dream 
of becoming rich. Th ese overstayers, oft en Nigerian Igbo (see Haugen 2012) but of a range of 
diff erent ethnicities and nationalities, were cracked down on by police beginning with a raid on 
Nigerian heroin dealers in August 2013 and continuing thereaft er to target all those foreigners 
without proper visas. Th is has continued until today, when the remaining overstayers are hes-
itant to venture outside their apartments, so worried are they about being apprehended. Th eir 
heyday is largely over, and indeed Xiaobei itself appears to be diminishing. Many Africans and 
Arabs in Guangzhou are turning their sights to new places of business, such as Vietnam’s Ho 
Chi Minh City. Vietnam lacks China’s restrictive visa regime and manufactures textiles rivaling 
Guangzhou’s in quality and price, although not yet electronics (although that will come, African 
boosters of Ho Chi Minh City maintain). Low-end globalization is a world in constant fl ux, 
and as Guangzhou becomes wealthier, and Xiaobei in particular becomes more “clean, safe and 
orderly” (Wilczak 2018), these places may no longer be its destination and pinnacle.
And yet, a number of Africans and Arabs in Xiaobei maintain that they sought to stay for 
as long as they could in the neighborhood. Most particularly this was for some because they 
had Chinese lovers or spouses and sometimes children; in a more mercenary sense, this was 
because they felt that they could make a far better living in Guangzhou than they ever could 
back in their home countries, if not in some other Asian city. Some saw Xiaobei, and Guang-
zhou at large, as a better and more developed place than their home countries (which some 
characterized as being stifl ed by corruption). Africans and Arabs will continue to come to 
Guangzhou and to Xiaobei, and at least some will stay, as tiny parts of the convoluted path by 
which China will become a multiethnic and multicultural society. When and if this eventually 
happens, Xiaobei will deserve at least a small place within chronicles of Chinese history, as the 
fi rst real foothold of the developing world in China, and perhaps a harbinger of China’s even-
tual immigrant future.
Discussion
Both of these case studies show how in considering migration and mobility within the Global 
South it is important to look at particular places (especially urban places) and their role in 
generating and reproducing patterns of movement. Of course, there are key diff erences. In 
Eastleigh, much of the movement we see can be classed as regional migration, although Somali 
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returnees from the diaspora in Western countries give the place a more global feel; in Xiao-
bei, we see migration principally of a more global scale, although its Uyghur and Hui and 
non-Guangzhou hukou populations demonstrate regional migration too. However, in both 
places migration and mobility is highly politicized: in Eastleigh, securitization in the wake of 
terrorist attacks, and age-old fear of Somalis in the country, has led to much hostility toward 
its Somali population; Xiaobei and its cosmopolitan population is not how China sees its ideal 
future relationship with Africa and elsewhere, the latter being much more a vision of Chinese 
in Africa, rather than Africans in China. Such places are built on migration and mobility, but 
states in the Global South are oft en every bit as intent on curbing this migration and mobility 
as those of the Global North.
Both places also speak of two key paths to migration that people in the global South travel 
along: those of asylum seeking or of low-end globalization—of obtaining political asylum as 
refugees, or of making money. For many of the Somalis in Eastleigh or Nigerians in Guang-
zhou, these paths are comparable strategies, with their comparative pluses and minuses. And 
these processes are bound to very distinct local places: Eastleigh, where Somalis recently fl eeing 
Al Shabaab via the Dadaab refugee complex may rub shoulders with Somali Americans from 
Minnesota sent by their parents to Eastleigh to learn Islam for a summer; or Xiaobei, where 
middle-class Kenyans, Congolese, and Nigerians may discuss alternative strategies for making 
money in Guangzhou but eventually moving their families to a Western country—or, perhaps, 
returning to their home countries. Th e physical proximity of community in Eastleigh and Xiao-
bei is the major source for the imagination of possibilities in the world for those who live there. 
Th is is a major role of physical communities in a world of globalization.
Eastleigh and Xiaobei both off er hope of mobility—both in the form of literal movement 
to elsewhere, and of social mobility through economic success. Th ey are seen as places where 
mobile dreams are capable of being grasped. Yet as we have also discussed, they can also be 
places of immobility, as people fi nd what they hoped would be temporary stays en route to 
wealthier elsewheres and futures become protracted and even permanent. While the low-end 
form of globalization that has generated such commercial hubs of the Global South is far more 
accessible than that of high fi nance that weaves together London, New York, and Tokyo, it can 
also bring despair. Although nonhegemonic in various ways, the forms of capitalism that under-
pin these hubs can be as brutal as any other.
Th e future of such places and the people whose movements have formed them into commer-
cial hubs is hardly secure, especially given the suspicion with which they are viewed. As we have 
seen, the trade networks of “low-end globalization” can also quickly shift  as new opportunities 
arise elsewhere. Yet this shift ing constellation of interconnected trade hubs in the Global South 
is likely to remain a major force in mediating the mobility and migration of many thousands. 
Th ese trade hubs may seem humble compared with the likes of Tokyo, London, and New York, 
but are of profound signifi cance for great numbers of people navigating globalization in the 
twenty-fi rst century.
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  NOTES
 1. Many Somalis and Oromo in the estate hope for resettlement in countries like the USA and UK, but 
such processes are protracted, and only a small proportion are able to move in this way.
 2. African traders from diff erent societies generally seem to get along in Xiaobei without overt confl ict, 
but there is a degree of tension between Muslims and Christians, as well as between East Africans and 
West Africans. East African logistics agents say that they would be reluctant to accept an order from 
a West African (and particularly an Igbo) customer: “Why would such a person be coming here to do 
business?”
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